The Police’s ability to collect and use information is essential for carrying out their broad range of functions and activities. The Police have always operated on the understanding that they, like anyone else, can lawfully record images and sounds in public places. A recent court judgment and findings from a joint inquiry by regulators have made clear that this was not the case.¹ The Tamiefuna v R [2025] NZSC 40 judgment found that the activities of the Police in gathering intelligence by taking photographs was a search and was in breach of section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. That case made clear that there were limits on the authority of the Police to lawfully gather intelligence (in the form of images). The bill goes further than the law was understood to be before the judgment, particularly when read in conjunction with the relevant joint inquiry findings.

These decisions have created uncertainty about the Police’s authority to record images and sounds in public places, and while lawfully in private places, and to use this information for a range of purposes. This includes for general intelligence purposes.² The bill seeks to provide further certainty and reaffirm that the Police have clear lawful authority to collect information for the purposes of performing broad policing functions and duties. It would amend the Act to make the following clear:

• The Police may collect or record information that may be used for any lawful purpose to the extent that it supports a policing function or activity. This includes safety and integrity (for example, supporting the use of body-worn cameras) and intelligence purposes.

• Information must only be collected for an intelligence purpose if a Police employee considers that it will, or may, support the Police in carrying out any of their functions or activities.

• The Police may record any image or sound in a public place and anything they can see or hear while lawfully in any private place, vehicle, or other thing. The collection would need to be for the Police’s lawful purposes, functions, and associated activities.

• Continuous recording or ongoing capture may only be undertaken solely for an intelligence purpose if it is reasonable to take the recording solely for that purpose. The duration of the recording must be no longer than is reasonable in the circumstances.

The bill also provides that the proposed amendments would not limit or affect information collection at common law or under other legislation.

Part 2 of the bill would expand the Police’s temporary road closure powers. It would do so by including a broader range of geographical areas and new grounds relating to antisocial road use, as well as creating new offences.

The proposed amendments would align with those being progressed through the Antisocial Road Use Legislation Amendment Bill. The bill passed its third reading on 30 June 2026. Under Standing Order 264, that bill’s amendments were limited to supporting its single broad policy, which is to deter antisocial driving behaviour that negatively affects road and community safety.

The Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) are a set of principles under the Privacy Act 2020 that govern how agencies can collect, store, use, and share personal information. IPP 1 governs the collection of personal information by prescribing when information may be collected. It provides that personal information must not be collected unless it is for a lawful purpose connected with an agency’s function or activity and the collection is necessary for that purpose.

The Privacy Commissioner raised significant concerns about Part 1 of the bill as introduced. One is that the bill would partially displace the application of key principles in the Privacy Act, which would affect his ability to provide oversight of Police information gathering.³ Other submitters also expressed concern that the Privacy Act would not continue to apply.

We received advice from the Police that the bill, once enacted, will be subject to other statutory frameworks. They include the Privacy Act, the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, and the Public Records Act 2005. The bill would not limit the jurisdiction of the Privacy Commissioner, and the IPPs would continue to apply. Section 24 of the Privacy Act recognises that other legislation may regulate personal information, overriding the application of certain IPPs. In the absence of an explicit disapplication provision, the Privacy Act would only be overridden where the applicable provision was so clearly incompatible with the Privacy Act that the two statutes could not be read together. The Privacy Commissioner’s jurisdiction would only be in question if the bill could not be read consistently with IPP 1, which officials told us they do not think is the case.

However, given submitters’ concerns, we think it would be beneficial to make clear that the Police would continue to be subject to the Privacy Act, including the IPPs. We therefore recommend inserting section 45E(1) to state that the collection of personal information authorised by proposed new sections 45A to 45D would be subject to IPPs 1 to 4 as set out in the Privacy Act (the IPPs relating to collection of personal information).

Clause 4 of the bill would insert proposed new section 45B into the Policing Act. It enables the Police to collect visual images and sounds in public places provided the images or sounds could be seen or heard from that place. Section 46 of the Search and Surveillance Act sets out the activities for which a surveillance device warrant is required. Some submitters were concerned that Police employees who were recording information that relies on new section 45B could circumvent the restrictions in section 46(1)(e) of the Search and Surveillance Act. Those restrictions deal with the observation of private activity in the land surrounding private premises.

We note that surveillance device warrants may be granted only where the Police are investigating serious suspected offending. The warrants are not available to make recordings for other purposes, such as the safety or integrity of Police officers. Further, we understand that the bill is not intended to authorise conduct that would otherwise require a surveillance device warrant. To avoid doubt, we recommend amending clause 4, proposed new section 45B. Our proposed amendment would ensure that Police employees could not make a recording in circumstances where a surveillance device warrant was needed under section 46 of the Search and Surveillance Act.

Clause 2(1) of the bill states that Part 1 would come into force one month after Royal assent. We recommend amending this clause to delay the commencement until 6 months after Royal assent. We consider that the delay would allow time for the Police to engage with key stakeholders, such as the Privacy Commissioner, when developing operational policies and training. It would also give the Police more time to test, update, and refine operational guidance, make IT changes, and provide training.

Clause 4, which would insert proposed new section 45C, specifies what information a Police employee could collect on a private property. They could record anything that they can see or hear without a surveillance device. We note that a Police station or place being used for Police purposes would likely be classified as private property for the purposes of the legislation. We consider that this could overly restrict what Police employees could do within their own premises. We recommend inserting section 45C(1A) to make it clear that the restrictions on information collection on a private property would not apply at Police stations or places being used for Police purposes.

We consider that the bill should be amended to require an independent statutory review of the operation of sections 45A to 45E of the Policing Act. We propose that the Minister of Police be required to commission the review as soon as practicable after the third anniversary of the commencement of those sections. The review should consider the necessity or desirability of any amendments to sections 45A to 45E or other related amendments to the Act. The Police, Privacy Commissioner, and Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) should be consulted as part of the review. A report should be prepared on the review, which the Minister should present to the House of Representatives. We recommend inserting clause 4A, new section 100A, to this effect. We would expect the reviewer to consult the Ministry of Justice, which is the department responsible for administering the Privacy Act and the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988.

As noted earlier in our commentary, the Privacy Commissioner had significant concerns with Part 1 of the bill and recommended that it not be passed. The Commissioner did not agree with Police’s assessment of the policy problem said to be addressed by Part 1 and was not persuaded that current legal settings prevent Police from effectively performing their functions. His preference was for a more careful and considered policy and consultation process to develop a statutory framework for Police intelligence gathering. The Commissioner’s main concerns were that the bill:

• would give the Police a very broad authorisation to collect information, including for an undefined “intelligence purpose”, which could lead to excessive collection and retention of personal information

• would partially displace the application of key principles in the Privacy Act, affecting his ability to provide oversight of Police information gathering

• does not include any meaningful safeguards.

If Part 1 of the bill proceeds, he recommended that it be amended to provide for safeguards. He noted that, while the Privacy Act provides crucial safeguards for privacy across the whole economy, it was never designed to provide an appropriate, purpose-specific framework for the regulation of Police intelligence gathering. The privacy principles are not well equipped, on their own, to respond to the challenges created by the bulk collection of personal information for law enforcement purposes that is facilitated by digital technologies.

To assist our consideration of the bill, we invited the Privacy Commissioner to provide comment on our confidential advice and to be present for some of our private consideration of the bill.

We have recommended that the bill be amended to make it clear that the collection of personal information authorised by proposed new sections 45A to 45D would be subject to certain IPPs. Given the breadth of this authority, the Privacy Commissioner suggested that the bill also be amended to include statutory safeguards for Police intelligence gathering. Ideally, he said, they should be in primary legislation. He noted that the flexible principles-based Privacy Act enables handling of personal information that aligns with lawful purposes. Specific limits on retaining intelligence information and its secondary use would rely on operational policies and guidelines. He considered that policies and guidelines, while necessary, should be developed under legislative direction, to support oversight and overall trust and confidence.

If, however, the safeguards were in regulations rather than primary legislation, the Commissioner set out what he thinks are necessary elements. His proposed regulation-making power would enable the Governor-General, by Order in Council, to make regulations prescribing safeguards and standards related to the Police’s ability to collect information under new sections 45A to 45D. The regulations would need to:

• set standards for storage, retention, secondary use, and destruction of personal information obtained by the Police

• set requirements for record-keeping, auditing, public reporting, and publishing relevant Police policies relating to the information collection

• specify safeguards relating to the collection of information from children and young people.

Before recommending regulations, the Minister would need to consult, invite, and consider submissions from certain groups. They are: the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Mana Mokopuna | Children’s Commissioner, the Human Rights Commission, the public, and any other person the Minister considered relevant. A breach of the regulations related to personal information should be treated as a matter in which a complaint could be made to the Privacy Commissioner under the Privacy Act. Parts 5 and 6 of the Act would apply to such breaches.

We discussed whether the bill should be amended to insert the regulation-making powers proposed by the Privacy Commissioner into the Policing Act. We considered that several changes would be needed if his suggested regulation-making powers were to be incorporated in the bill. For example, we consider that a requirement for the Minister to consult the public would be too broad. Instead, the Minister should be required to consult the organisations and individuals that they consider represent the interests of the groups of people who would be substantially affected by the proposed regulations. We note that our reference to “individuals” would ensure that the proposed Inspector-General of Police would be covered.

The Police advised us that they do not recommend inserting a regulation-making power into the legislation, for the following reasons:

• The Police would remain subject to existing legislative obligations and safeguards governing the collection and management of information. This includes collection, use, re-use, and retention requirements under the Privacy Act, and storage and retention requirements under the Official Information Act 1982, the Public Records Act, and the Policing Act.

• There is no compelling reason why regulations are required on top of these existing statutory requirements.

• The IPPs are principles-based and allow for the range of situations in which the Police may collect and manage information. The regulations would reduce the IPPs’ flexibility.

• Regulations could create new regulatory layers that would displace existing safeguards, like the IPPs, and could conflict with requirements in the Public Records Act.

• Regulations would add operational, IT, and systems burdens for the Police. The burdens are likely to be complex, expensive, and resource-intensive for the Police to design, consult on, and implement. This could delay the implementation of the information-collection provisions in the bill for at least two years, and new IT investment might be needed.

• Regulations would increase uncertainty and ongoing legal risk both before and after the bill commenced. This is because of the introduction of additional legal tests associated with information management. The additional tests would likely affect prosecutions.

The Police instead propose that safeguards will be provided through binding operational guidance, technical controls, and existing statutory and regulatory frameworks. We discussed whether, in the absence of a regulation-making power, the bill could be amended to require the Police to consult the Privacy Commissioner, the Children’s Commissioner, and the Human Rights Commission when developing this guidance. The Police emphasised the importance of strong oversight and public confidence in exercising policing functions and activities. Accordingly, they told us that they will consult the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, the Children’s Commissioner, and other agencies, where appropriate, on operational guidance supporting the legislation. The Police will contact the Human Rights Commission but recognise that it did not submit on the bill and may not wish to engage in the process.

We seriously considered inserting a regulation-making power into the bill. Although we have decided against doing so, we have recommended that the Minister of Police commission an independent statutory review of the legislation three years after its commencement. We would expect the Privacy Commissioner to play an instrumental role in this review. Following that review, we trust that the Justice Committee of the 55th Parliament will consider inserting a regulation-making power into the legislation if it considers that the protections in the Privacy Act or other applicable legislation are insufficient.

The Privacy Act enables the Privacy Commissioner to initiate inquiries and investigations, and issue compliance notices. In 2021, the Privacy Commissioner issued a compliance notice requiring the Police to remedy non-compliance with the Privacy Act when photographing members of the public.

The Police noted that they have completed all but one of the original requirements that were set out in the notice. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner noted that the remaining requirement, to delete all unlawfully collected photos and to specify the means and time line for doing so, is significant and remains in force. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner told us that the Police’s information systems do not enable them to find all the photos. It said it is working with the Police to confirm an assurance process controlling the access and use of historic photos.

We understand that the Police are exploring ways to better classify information that supports their functions and duties. The introduction of a digital notebook is a recent example. It enables police officers to upload photos and record the lawful purpose and circumstances under which they were taken to support a lawful Police function or related activity. As of March 2026, the use of digital notebook is mandatory for police officers to record policing activities.

The Privacy Commissioner referred to the recommendations from the report of the independent quality assurance review into the use of Police-issued smartphones. This review was commissioned by the Police in 2024 in response to the Privacy Commissioner’s compliance notice. One recommendation is to explore the use of mandatory fields in digital notebooks. The report suggested that the mandatory fields could include recording the lawful purpose for taking a photo of a member of the public. We were subsequently informed that digital notebooks now contain mandatory fields. We were also told that when a photo is captured in the digital notebook, the officer must select the reason for capture from the options “investigation” or “noting”. Officers are also expected to enter a description. We understand that this information can be searched and viewed in Digital Notebook Office. In each instance, additional metadata is captured (date, time, and location of the phone). Photos that are sensitive should be marked with a “secure” note, which limits access. We were informed by the Police that the functionality of the digital notebook also continues to be improved and extended, with rollouts occurring regularly.

The Government argues that this bill merely reaffirms Police’s ability to collect intelligence with the purpose of preventing, disrupting, and addressing crime. This is not an honest characterisation of where this bill comes from.

In 2020, an investigation by Radio New Zealand found that young Māori in Wairarapa had been stopped by Police officers and had their photographs taken. These were children who were not breaking any law and were walking down the street in broad daylight.

In 2022, the Independent Police Conduct Authority and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner released a Joint Inquiry into Police conduct when photographing members of the public. This report found “officers routinely taking, using and retaining photographs when it is not lawful for them to do so.” It also found that thousands of unlawful photographs were taken and kept, even after being instructed by the Privacy Commissioner to delete the photographs.

In 2025, Tamiefuna v R [2025] NZSC 40 declared that within public places “it remains important to preserve a sufficient zone of privacy. That in turn is part of preserving the fundamentals of a liberal democracy.” This bill seeks to overturn that ruling. The draft commentary in this bill argues that this judgment has created uncertainty and narrowed the law. Police do not, and have never had, a general common law power to collect information about persons in public places but are now amending the law to make it so.

This bill risks over-reach into ordinary New Zealanders’ lives. Privacy rights under section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights [Unreasonable search and seizure] and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation] are not upheld or protected under this bill.

The benefits of this type of intelligence collection are outweighed by the infringement upon ordinary civilians’ rights to privacy—a right that they do not waive when entering public places. Moreover, the powers this bill grants do not appear to be clearly linked to a policing activity or investigation. That means that innocent people could have their photograph taken or be recorded without any clear lawful purpose or investigation. To collect this information for potential or speculative future use is especially concerning. How should or could an officer determine if someone is capable of committing a crime in the future? This opens the door to several biases, as evidenced by the collection of thousands of photographs of Māori children who were photographed by Police for looking “out of place”, despite having committed no crime.

It is especially concerning to give such wide-ranging discretionary power to an organisation whose systemic bias and structural racism has been independently verified and subsequently denied by senior Police leadership including the Minister of Police, through various phases of the Understanding Policing Delivery phases and reports. Without addressing structural inequities, such wide-ranging powers are fertile grounds for biases to grow and for the continued unexplained disproportionality of Māori throughout the criminal justice system.

This bill gives far too much discretionary power to Police despite the Joint Inquiry in 2022 finding a “general lack of awareness amongst Police of their obligations under the Privacy Act”. The bill’s intent is to give Police the power to record images and sounds in public in all circumstances, but there is a lack of safeguards.

On safeguards, the Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) would be one of the oversight bodies that monitors compliance with the law and privacy principles under the Privacy Act until the Inspector-General of Police is established. The IPCA does not investigate 98–99 percent of Police complaints, with funding constraints being a big part of this problem. These comments were echoed by the current Chair of the IPCA, Judge Kenneth Johnston KC, in May this year who said that the IPCA is not truly independent and desperately needs more funding. More discretionary power should not be given to Police while its watchdog remains underfunded, and not truly independent.

We do not support this bill as it is an unnecessary overreach into the privacy of New Zealand citizens. We are concerned that there are insufficient safeguards in place, and that limits and oversight have not been contemplated adequately in the development of this bill. This bill has been designed to overturn a decision made in the highest court in New Zealand in order to surveil law-abiding citizens and to grant Police wide-ranging, discretionary power without adequate organisational and frontline understanding of Police’s obligations under the Privacy Act.