The Justice Committee has examined the Corrections (Management of Prisoners, and Prisoners’ Property) Amendment Bill and recommends by majority that it be passed. We recommend all amendments by majority.

The bill would amend the Corrections Act 2004 and associated regulations in five main ways. The most substantive change would be to establish a statutory framework for the safe and humane management of a small group of prisoners who pose an extreme risk. Such prisoners are held in the Prisoners of Extreme Risk Unit (the PERU) at Auckland Prison.

Under the bill, the chief executive of the Department of Corrections would be able to designate a person as a DMP (designated-management prisoner) if they consider that the person poses an extreme risk to prison or public safety while in custody and that a higher level of custodial management is needed to manage that risk. The bill would establish clear processes for managing these prisoners, designed to uphold their rights.

The bill would also expand the existing segregation powers by introducing new grounds for segregating a prisoner if they are considered likely to recruit others into organised criminal groups or ideologies where this would be likely to result in harm.

Another change, affecting all prisoners, would be to enable frontline staff to vary the segregation status of prisoners more easily between restricted and denied association. This would enable prisoners to have as much contact with others as can be safely managed according to the risk they pose.

The bill would introduce new meaningful human contact provisions to reduce the harmful effects of limited social interaction for a small number of prisoners who are managed in more restrictive environments. It would prohibit prolonged solitary confinement and provide for minimum meaningful human contact requirements for all prisoners (at least 10 hours of meaningful human contact over a 14-day period).

The bill would enable Corrections to apply to the High Court for an order authorising the destruction of a designated terrorist entity’s personal property after their death. It would also introduce measures to reduce the illicit use of prisoner trust accounts for purposes such as intimidating or influencing other prisoners, laundering money, or receiving proceeds of crime.

This commentary covers the main amendments we recommend to the bill as introduced. We do not discuss minor or technical amendments.

Clause 2 states when the bill’s provisions would come into force. While most sections would come into force on the day after Royal assent, clause 2(3) specifies some exceptions that would come into force 12 months after Royal assent. We recommend inserting subclause (2A) to specify that new sections 70(3A) to (8) would come into force 6 months after Royal assent. This would align with the DMP provisions coming fully into operation 6 months after commencement.

At present, section 45 of the Act empowers Corrections to destroy or dispose of a prisoner’s property in certain circumstances, including if it is dangerous, alcohol, or a health hazard. Clause 7 would replace section 45 by removing an existing requirement for the prisoner to be present for the disposal of property. The new section would require a prison manager to give written notice of the decision and provide an appeal process for a prisoner to challenge the decision.

We note that dangerous, perishable, and hazardous items tend to be discarded immediately when an offender arrives at prison or when intercepted through incoming mail. We consider that it would not be practicable to provide written notice to a prisoner about the decision to destroy this type of property and to allow 14 days for their response, as proposed in new section 45.

The Act also allows Corrections to destroy or dispose of a prisoner’s property where a prisoner has failed to remove it after being requested to do so. In these circumstances, procedural protections already exist, including regulation 35 of the Corrections Regulations 2005.

Given that the changes in proposed new section 45 are either not practicable or provisions already exist, we recommend amending proposed new section 45 by removing subsections (3), (4), and (5).

Clause 8 would insert new section 45AA so that the chief executive could apply for a court order to destroy property belonging to a person who, on their death, was a terrorist entity or (if it is trust account money) forfeited to the Crown.

We consider that the bill does not address a scenario where a terrorist entity designation may be lifted, but the prisoner remains in prison and dies there. A terrorist entity designation may be revoked or not renewed, for example, if the prisoner becomes incapacitated due to a degenerative disease. We think that in this scenario the prisoner’s property could still pose a risk of harm by virtue of belonging to that once-designated terrorist entity. We recommend broadening the scope of this provision so it would cover a prisoner who was designated a terrorist entity at any point in their life, rather than just at the time of their death.

At present, section 46(4)(b) of the Act stipulates that any money held in trust for a prisoner who dies in custody must be paid to the executor or administrator of the prisoner’s estate. We recommend amending clause 9 of the bill so that if the prisoner was a terrorist entity, section 46(4)(b) would only apply if the money was not being forfeited to the Crown. That is, any money would only be paid to a deceased terrorist’s estate if the Crown chose not to apply for forfeiture or applied and was declined by the courts.

Section 47 of the Act requires that every prisoner who is subject to a sentence of more than 3 months must be assigned a security classification that reflects the level of risk they pose. The security classification must be reviewed at least once every 6 months.

As introduced, clause 11 would amend section 47 to specify that when a DMP holds a security classification, it would not need to be reviewed every 6 months. We understand the intention is that a designated-management prisoner would be managed in line with their designation as a DMP, rather than according to a security classification. This is because a prisoner’s security classification might not capture the risks they pose relating to ideological influence, manipulation, radicalisation, or organised criminal activity.

We think that the bill should make the policy intent clearer. We recommend amending clause 11 by inserting new section 47(2) to specify that no security classification is to be assigned to a DMP who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding 3 months.

We acknowledge submitters’ views that removing the security classification process for a DMP might have the effect of removing the pathway by which a prisoner could demonstrate progress and access rehabilitation. We note that the bill as introduced does not remove the classification requirement for other prisoners. But we think this requirement should be made clearer. We recommend inserting new section 47(2A) to require a security classification for any prisoner sentenced for more than 3 months if they ceased to be a DMP, provided they continued to be subject to a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding 3 months.

Part 2 of the Corrections Amendment Regulations 2025, which is due to come into force in September 2028, will establish the risk categories for remand prisoners (new regulations 43A–43K). Clause 29 of the bill would amend new regulation 43A to ensure that the principles of risk assessment for remand prisoners would not apply to a DMP. We consider that a similar change should be made in new regulation 43B (duty to carry out risk assessment of remand prisoner). Therefore, we recommend inserting clause 29A to amend new regulation 43B to specify that the new regulation would not apply to a DMP.

New regulation 43F (duty to review risk category) will require that the risk category assigned to a higher-risk remand prisoner be reviewed every 6 months. Clause 30 would amend new regulation 43F by requiring that a remand DMP’s risk category only be reviewed if their designation expires or has been revoked. For consistency, we recommend amending clause 30, new regulation 43F(1) by inserting “other than a remand prisoner who is a designated-management prisoner” to specify that the mandatory 6-month review does not apply to a DMP who has already been assigned into a risk category.

New section 52A(1) would enable the chief executive to make an interim or a final designation of a person as a DMP. Their decision would be informed by the DMP Advisory Panel’s recommendation. Several submitters commented on the perceived risk and appropriateness of the chief executive making interim or final designation decisions. They suggested that such decisions should be made by an independent decision-maker.

We consider that the chief executive is the most appropriate person to make an interim or final designation, because it is an administrative decision that falls within their mandate. Nevertheless, we agree with submitters that there should be a degree of independence in this process. We recommend amending proposed new Schedule 1AB (inserted by clause 25) to specify that the chairperson or an acting chairperson of the new DMP Advisory Panel must be independent of Corrections.

Proposed new Schedule 1AB relates to the DMP Advisory Panel. Clause 6 of the new Schedule specifies the information that the panel would need to consider when considering a person for designation. We note that it does not specify information relating to how Corrections has previously managed the prisoner or what risks need to be managed. We recommend inserting paragraphs (aaa) and (aab) so the advisory panel would also need to consider how the department has managed the prisoner in the past and is currently managing them, and the current risks posed by the prisoner.

New section 52C would establish a two-step test for designating a person as a DMP. The chief executive would need to be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the prisoner poses an extreme risk to prison or public safety, and that restrictive management is necessary to manage that risk.

We note that the term “prison or public safety” is not used in the Act. For consistency, we recommend amending proposed new section 52C(a) to reflect existing wording in the Act, by stating that the prisoner would need to pose an extreme risk to “public safety, safety of prisoners, safety of staff members or employees or visitors, or prison safety or security”. We also recommend amending new section 52D to reflect this amendment.

The second part of the test to designate a prisoner as a DMP would require the chief executive to be satisfied on reasonable grounds that a more restrictive type of management is necessary to manage the prisoner’s risk. We recommend amending proposed section 52C(b) to “extreme risk” rather than just “risk”, as the purpose of the test is to identify a prisoner who poses an extreme risk.

New section 52D would specify the type of conduct considered to pose an extreme risk for the purposes of new section 52C(a). We understand that new section 52D was deliberately framed to capture a wide range of conduct, including direct and indirect action taken to cause harm. We are aware that some of the highest risk a prisoner can pose is influencing others to cause harm without themselves acting directly. Although new section 52D appears to capture a wide range of conduct, we consider that it needs to be read alongside new sections 52C and 52E. Together, sections 52C and 52E would act as safeguards in establishing whether the threshold of extreme risk has been met.

We understand that new section 52D(1) is designed to cover a wide range of serious offences, but note that the only example given is a serious sexual or violent offence. We recommend amending section 52D(1)(a) to make it clear that “serious offence” could also capture drug offending, money laundering, the trading or trafficking of illicit goods, human trafficking, and offences under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.

Given that we propose including offences under the Terrorism Suppression Act under section 52D(1)(a), we recommend removing section 52D(1)(c), which refers to that Act separately.

We are aware that new section 52D(1) is intended to apply to a person linked to transnational organised crime, but we do not think that this cohort of prisoners is adequately covered by paragraphs (a) to (d). Therefore, we recommend inserting new paragraph (c) to mirror the grounds in clause 14, new section 58(1)(e): “recruiting a prisoner or another person into an organised criminal group”.

We note that the bill as introduced uses the term “ideology” rather than “violent extremist ideology” or “extremist ideology” because these terms are not defined in New Zealand law. Nevertheless, we consider that new section 52D(1)(d) is intended to capture terrorism and violent extremism. We recommend inserting new section 52D(2A) to make it clear that harm to a person who is radicalised or recruited to an ideology includes harm to that person through their participation in, or involvement with, terrorism, violent extremism, or both. We note that the term “violent extremism” appears in the Intelligence and Security Act 2017 and in the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.

New section 58 would introduce an additional segregation power that would allow a prison manager to direct that the opportunity of a prisoner to associate with other prisoners be restricted or denied. One of the grounds on which a prison manager could restrict or deny the ability to associate with others would be if they believed a prisoner or another person would be radicalised or recruited to an ideology that would likely result in harm. In line with our proposed addition of new section 52D(2A), we recommended amending section 58 by inserting new subsection (1AA) to define “harm” in similar terms.

New section 52E provides more detail about what would constitute an extreme risk for the purposes of sections 52C(a) and 52D. As introduced, the risk (if not managed restrictively) would involve a high likelihood of that conduct happening, or that conduct causing a severe degree of harm, or both.

We recognise that “likelihood” might imply a narrow measurable standard as opposed to a broad assessment of risk. We think the use of “real risk” would better reflect the risk assessments made by the DMP Advisory Panel and the chief executive, and be more consistent with other decisions about a prisoner’s management. We, therefore, recommend amending section 52E(1) to state that “an extreme risk of conduct includes a real risk of”.

New section 52I would provide for natural justice rights for the person being considered for a designation, and prisoners who are already DMPs. We recommend amending new section 52I(1) to set out more clearly the information that must be given to an interim or final designated prisoner.

As introduced, proposed new section 52I(e) would require the chief executive to give the person a written summary of the reasons why an interim or final designation was made designating that person. In line with our proposed rearrangement of section 52I, we recommend amending it to specify that the requirement for a written summary would apply to both an interim DMP (new section 52I(1)(a)) or a final DMP (new section 52I(1)(c)(ii)). In the interests of transparency, we recommend inserting new section 52IA to require the chief executive to maintain records of the reasons why a designation was made.

Under new section 52H, before the chief executive decides whether to make or replace a final designation, they would be required to request and take into account the DMP Advisory Panel’s recommendation and the information it had considered. The Ombudsman submitted that the Panel should provide reasons for its recommendation to the chief executive, and those reasons should be made available to the prisoner being considered for DMP status.

We agree with the Ombudsman that there should be greater transparency of the designation process for a prisoner who is subject to a designation decision. We consider that transparency of the chief executive’s decision is especially important because they make the final designation decision, and may consider any other advice or information that has not been made available to the Panel. In addition, the chief executive is not bound by the recommendation of the Panel when making their decision.

To increase transparency of the decision-making process, we recommend the following amendments:

• in Schedule 1AB, insert new clause 5(3A) to specify that the Panel’s recommendation must be recorded and must include details of the Panel’s members, the reasons why the Panel made its recommendation, and if the Panel was split, any other recommendation and reasons for it

• insert section 52I(1)(c) to specify that a person who has been designated as a DMP would be provided a copy of the DMP Advisory Panel’s recommendation, including a summary of details required by clause 5(3A)(b) and (c) of Schedule 1AB

• insert section 52H(4) to require the chief executive to record their reasons for departing, to any extent, from the Panel’s recommendation.

Clause 6 would amend section 10 to specify the decisions and responsibilities that the chief executive may not delegate to prison staff. We recommend amending section 10 so the chief executive’s designation-making powers for DMPs are non-delegable, which would reflect the seriousness of designation decisions. We recommend a narrow exception to this provision, where the chief executive has an actual or potential conflict of interest regarding a DMP.

We recognise that a prisoner must be able to understand information provided to them under new section 52I and be able to engage in the designation process or a review of a designation. Section 52I as introduced only refers to a “written notice” or a “written summary”. We think this might disadvantage a prisoner with literacy or communication difficulties and limit their access to natural justice. We recommend inserting new section 52IB stating that if the chief executive or a staff member is aware that a DMP has difficulties with verbal or written communication, they must ensure that the person is provided with adequate communication assistance to understand and participate in the designation process or a review of a designation.

New section 52J specifies when an interim or final designation could come into force, how long it could last for, and when they could be renewed and replaced. We understand that the proposed provisions in subsection (2)(a) and (b) are intended to provide that an interim designation would end if a person is released from prison, whether because they have been remanded at large (released with no restrictions or conditions) or released on bail, parole, or at the end of their sentence.

We consider that if these provisions are interpreted strictly, there is a risk that the interim designation might end if a person has completed their sentence but remains in custody because of active charges before the courts. For this reason, we recommend amending section 52J(2)(a) and (b) by specifying that an interim designation would only end if the person is released from prison for the reasons in new section 52J(2)(a). It would, however, remain in place if the prisoner remains in the legal custody of the chief executive. We recommend consequential amendments to new section 52J(a) and Schedule 1, clause 11(2).

New section 52K provides for a review by the chief executive of an in-force final designation. New section 52K(1) would require the department to inform the chief executive of any new information relevant to the designation or a change in a factor on which the designation is based.

We recognise that, to be able to inform the chief executive’s review process, a prison manager needs to be aware of the details of the chief executive’s decision to designate a person as a DMP. We recommend amending section 52K by inserting subsection (1AAA) to require the chief executive to promptly provide the relevant prison manager with copies of a decision to designate a person as a DMP, including information identifying all factors on which the designation is based. This amendment would enable a relevant prison manager to identify situations where circumstances have changed in accordance with new section 52K(1).

We note that under new section 52K(3), the chief executive must review an in-force final designation if they are satisfied, on their own initiative or on a written request by a DMP, that developments make the designation unnecessary or inappropriate. We consider that, in the interests of natural justice, whenever a DMP challenges their designation, a prison manager should be required to provide this information to the chief executive as soon as practicable. Therefore, we recommend amending section 52K by inserting new subsection (3A) to require a relevant prison manager to promptly forward to the chief executive a written request from a DMP to review their designation.

New section 52I would require the chief executive to give a prisoner written notice in a timely manner when they are considering designating the prisoner as a DMP. We consider that this should not be the case if there are reasonable grounds to believe that doing so would compromise public safety, the health and safety of any prisoner, or prison safety, security, and good order. We recommend inserting section 52I(2) and (3) to this effect.

Under section 52I(g), the Panel would be required to consider any written information or submission provided by, or on behalf of, the prisoner who is being considered for a final designation. We think there should be a specified timeframe for the prisoner to provide any information to the Panel. We recommend amending section 52I and clause 6(a) of new Schedule 1AB so a prisoner would be given at least 14 days to provide a written submission or information to the Panel to consider before it makes its recommendation.

New section 52L provides for the effect of an in-force designation (restrictive management and entitlements). We note that “restrictive management” is a new statutory concept, and consider that this term should not be defined exhaustively, as restrictions might vary according to individual risk. However, we think that the bill should make clear that this legislation does not create new types of restrictions. Any restrictions must be imposed under existing statutory powers.

We recommend amending new section 52L(1)(b) and (3) to state that these are examples of more restrictive management (other than the required placement) and are subject to the relevant statutory powers and duties in the Act and Regulations. In addition, we recommend deleting section 52L(3)(b) because a restriction of freedom of movement is not a characteristic of a restrictive environment.

On 24 June 2026, while we were considering the bill, Cabinet agreed to additional amendments relating to the daily exercise entitlement.² Some of us are disappointed that we did not have an opportunity to consider these changes during the public submission process.

The Act requires that prisoners be provided with at least one hour of physical exercise each day, which may be taken in the open air if weather permits. This provision is based on rule 23(1) of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).

We are aware that custodial staff sometimes face operational situations where it is not reasonably practicable or safe to allow prisoners daily exercise. Any exception to the exercise entitlement for a prisoner is recorded by custodial staff. We understand that more than half of the recorded exceptions relate to emergency, security, or health and safety reasons under section 69(2) of the Act. The reasons for the remaining recorded exceptions are unclear. We accept that a decision to not provide the physical exercise entitlement might be necessary in some circumstances. However, we consider that the absence of clear statutory parameters and safeguards might result in inconsistent decision making and limited scrutiny of these decisions.

For this reason, we recommend amending the bill to strengthen the safeguards for all physical exercise exceptions, including existing exceptions. These new safeguards would build upon, or modify, existing exceptions in section 69 of the Act.

Clause 18 would insert new section 69A, which would establish minimum requirements for meaningful human contact for all prisoners. Proposed section 69A(1) describes what the new section does. We think there should be a sharper distinction between the rule prohibiting prolonged solitary confinement and other requirements regarding minimum meaningful human contact. We recommend amending section 69A(1) accordingly.

Section 70 of the Act states that a prisoner may have at least 1 hour of exercise every day and it may be taken in the open air if the weather permits. We are aware that prison infrastructure, staffing, and prisoner needs determine how this entitlement is provided. Some prisoners may need to exercise individually or in small groups because of separation requirements, risk management, or non-association arrangements. Some prison sites have large open-air yards, while other sites have smaller enclosed yards, including cell-adjacent yards. High-security exercise yards include security features, such as mesh roofs where walls are less than five metres high.

The Act does not specify what exercise in the open air means. We recommend addressing this gap by inserting clause 18A, which would insert new section 70(3). This new section would specify that areas used for exercise could have security features, such as solid walls, bars, or mesh, and may but need not have overhead features (for example, all or any of overhead bars, overhead mesh, and roofing features). This would make it clear that security and roofing features do not detract from a prisoner’s ability to exercise in the open air.

Alongside the bill’s other provisions, we consider it important to ensure that the Act gives prisoners appropriate access to exercise yards for their entitlement to daily exercise. We recommend inserting section 70(8) to define what a single-prisoner yard means to align with the changes we recommend below.

We are aware that DMPs and some segregated prisoners could be held in cells with a single-prisoner yard where they can exercise. A single-prisoner yard, however, is small compared to other types of exercise areas and might not give a prisoner enough room to do certain types of exercise. We consider that a DMP or other prisoners who exercise in a single-prisoner yard should be given the opportunity to access an exercise yard that is larger than a single-prisoner yard.

For these reasons, we recommend amending clause 18A to insert new section 70(4), (5), and (6). New subsections (4) and (5) would state that a DMP, or any other prisoner, who has exercised in a single-prisoner yard for 15 or more consecutive days (whether or not they are segregated for all or any of those 15 days), may exercise in a single-prisoner yard provided they also receive regular opportunities to exercise in a larger yard. We also recommend inserting section 70(3A) to enable any other prisoner to take physical exercise in a single-prisoner yard or a larger yard if they are not a DMP, nor any other prisoner, to whom new section 70(4) applies.

New section 70(6) would specify that new sections 70(4)(b) and 70(5) would not apply if:

• exercising in a larger yard is likely to affect negatively the prisoner’s or another’s health and safety; or

• the prisoner is separated from others for disciplinary reasons; or

• the prisoner is segregated for medical reasons or is at risk of self-harm; or

• all of those reasons or any combination of them applies.

As an additional safeguard, we recommend inserting section 70(7) so a prison manager or their delegate would be required to record clearly when they do not provide regular exercise in a larger yard as required by new subsection 70(5). They would also be required to record clearly the reasons for not doing so as permitted under new section 70(6). This would facilitate national monitoring and analysis.

Clause 19 would amend section 77, which relates to a prisoner’s minimum entitlement to make outgoing telephone calls. The amendments would allow every prisoner who is not a DMP to make at least 1 outgoing telephone call per week that is at least 5 minutes long. Meanwhile, a DMP would be allowed to make at least 1 or more outgoing telephone calls whose duration is at least 2 hours.

We support these proposed amendments to the Act, but we note that neither the Act nor the bill defines what constitutes a telephone call. We recommend inserting clause 19(2), new section 77(8) to define a “telephone facility” as any telephone system or audio link that a prisoner has access to inside a prison. Our proposed amendment would also specify that an audiovisual link that a prisoner is permitted to use could count as a telephone facility.

We recommend a corresponding amendment to section 69A(4)(c)(ii) to specify that meaningful human contact includes telephone calls made by any “telephone facility” under section 77(1) or (2) and (8)(a). This proposed amendment would, however, exclude the use of any audiovisual link referred to in new section 77(8)(b).

Clause 23 would insert new section 201A. It would provide that regulations that regulate the operation of trust accounts may authorise a manager of a prison (which may, but need not, be the manager of the prison in which the prisoner is detained) to refuse to approve a deposit, or to prevent a withdrawal, if they are satisfied that prescribed grounds apply to the transaction. Proposed new section 201A(2)(b) states that a prison manager could prevent a withdrawal from a trust account for a particular prisoner with the prisoner’s approval if the prison manager is satisfied that grounds prescribed in the regulations apply to the transaction. We consider that a prison manager should not have to obtain the approval of a prisoner to prevent a withdrawal from a trust account if a prison manager is satisfied that the grounds have been met. We recommend amending new section 201A(2)(b) by removing the consent provision.

Clause 28 would amend regulations 42 and 42A of the Corrections Regulations 2005, which relate to trust account deposits and withdrawals. The proposed amendments would give a manager of a prison (which may, but need not, be the manager of the prison in which the prisoner is detained) the power to approve and decline deposits and withdrawals from trust accounts. We consider that there might be situations where the prison manager who is best placed to approve or decline a transaction is not the prison manager of the prison where the prisoner is located. Therefore, we recommend amending regulations 42 and 42A so any prison manager could approve and decline transactions.

Clause 38 would amend regulation 183 of the Corrections Regulations 2005 (prison to contact nominated person) by stating that the regulation would apply to an at-risk prisoner. We note that if a young person is designated as a DMP, they are also likely to be subject to a segregation direction. In many cases, this would result in a nominated person being notified. We are aware, however, that a DMP designation and segregation directions are decisions made independently of one another. Therefore, we recommend amending clause 38 to require Corrections to notify a nominated person when a young person is designated as a DMP.

Schedule 1 of the bill would insert new Part 2 in Schedule 1AA of the Act. We recommend amending proposed new Part 2 by inserting new clauses 8A and 9A to specify which prisoners would be affected by the physical exercise amendments and the telephone facility definition amendment.

The Greens oppose this bill in its current form as it fails to meet international standards for its treatment of solitary confinement. Whilst we are supportive of the intention to improve minimum entitlements for prisoners, we cannot support a bill which fails to comply with international standards such as the United Nations Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules).

We strongly felt that throughout the select committee process, the affirmation of minimum entitlements in law were guided by what level of compliance is operationally possible within Corrections, as opposed to what evidence says around rehabilitation, meaningful human contact, human rights, and international conventions.

We note that this bill has been drafted off the back of Corrections’ ongoing non-compliance with the minimum entitlements of all prisoners legislated under the Corrections Act 2004, leading to a mandamus order being issued by the High Court to the chief executive of Corrections in late 2025, which requires the chief executive to uphold their legal responsibilities and duties.